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RECENT CASES
Annulment-Nature of the Fraud Necessary to be Proved for
Annulment of Marriage-To plaintiff's bill for support of herself and
child, defendant filed cross-claim for annulment of marriage. Defendant
had had an illicit relation with plaintiff, who subsequently informed him
that she was pregnant with his child, and would prosecute if he failed to
marry her. Four months after their marriage a child was born. Defendant
introduced Blood-Grouping Tests 1 to prove non-paternity of the child,
and lower court annulled marriage. Plaintiff appealed on the ground that
this evidence is inadmissible. Held, Affirmed. Such evidence is ad-
missible, and together with the other evidence constitutes sufficient fraud
to grant annulment. Anderson v. Anderson, N. Y. L. J. p. i, col. 3, Sept.
16, 1942 (C. C. of Cook Co., Ill.).
The difficulties confronting the court were not resolved with the
holding, in line with modern authority,2 that this evidence was sufficient
to overcome the strong presumption that the child is legitimate; 3 for, even
after admitting the evidence, there is the broader question as to whether
a fraudulent misrepresentation as to the paternity of an unborn child is
sufficient fraud on which to base an annulment, since it is difficult to show
clear-cut duress.4  The traditional rule has been that the fraud must "go
I. It is understood that the Landsteiner Test cannot establish proof of paternity,
but can conclusively determine non-paternity where the blood types of husband, wife,
and child are all available, as in instant case. Note the developing attitude that the tests
are scientifically certain in Report of the American Medical Association's Committee
ot Medicolegal Blood Grouping Tests (1937) Io8 JouR. OF Am. MEa. Assm. 2138-
2142; WIGMoRE, EviDEccE (Supp. 1934) §§ 165a, 165b; HEKTOmbI, Biologic Tests
for Medicolegal Purposes (1928) 199 NENW ENG. JouR. OF MED. 120-126.
2. Beach v. Beach, 114 F. (2d) 479 (C. C. A. D. C. 1940) ; Arais v. Kelensnikoff,
1O Cal. (2d) 428, 74 P. (2d) 1043 (937) ; Commonwealth, ex rel. v. Visocki, 23 D. &
C. 1O3 (Pa. 1935).
3. Westfall v. Westfall, ioo Ore. 224, 197 P. 271 (1921); Pinkard v. Pinkard,
252 S. W. 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
The courts have used most positive language to characterize the kind of evidence
which will be sufficient to overcome the presumption. Franks v. State, 26 Ala. App.
430, i61 So. 549 (1935) ("highest proof"); Rankin v. Dunn, 243 Ky. 784, 49 S. W.
(2d) l118 (1932) ("convincing") ; In re McAnany's Estate, 91 Pa. Super. 317 (927)
("clear, direct, satisfactory, and irrefragable").
Cf. Bove v. Pinciotti, C. P. No. 6 of Phila. Co. (Pa. 1942), apparently the most
recent case in Pennsylvania on evidence overcoming the presumption of legitimacy. In
this case, the only evidence of illegitimacy introduced was oral testimony offered by
husband and wife that the child was illegitimate. The bill for annulment was dis-
missed, but Bok, J., in his opinion filed July 28, 1942, made it clear that he hoped the
case would be appealed to get the point settled. Note that the evidence on which such
appeal would be based would not be expert testimony, and not even free from a sus-
picion of bias; whereas in the instant case the evidence was not only expert, but almost
conclusive; and completely independent of any possibility of partiality for either plain-
tiff or defendant. For a r~surA of Bove v. Pinciotti, see 107 Lm. INT. 239, col. I
(Aug. 18, 1942).
See, on the general relation of the Blood Grouping Tests to the law, and collected
cases involving the tests, (934) I CHI. L. REV. 798; (I937) 21 MINN. L. REv. 671,
68o; and (I937) 17 Oa. L. REv. 177, 190.
4. The agreed facts showed that defendant, after being threatened by plaintiff,
went home and talked the situation over with his mother, who advised him to get mar-
ried. The court, however, tried to make out duress, citing only Short v. Short, 265
Ill. App. 133 (1932) in support. That case is distinguishable, in that the petitioner
had been kept in court under custody, without liberty to leave, until he decided to go
forward with the marriage. This was unquestionably duress of imprisonment, and
quite distinguishable from the facts in instant case. Yet, as noted, the court held
duress as well as fraud. Contra: Jacobs v. Jacobs, 146 Ark. 45, 225 S. W. 22 (192o);
cf. Kibler v. Kibler, 18o Ark. 1152, 24 S. W. (2d) 867 (1930).
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to the essence of the marital relationship". 5 Where the health of the parties
would be endangered, or where for any reason consummation of the
marriage would be unlawful, 7 clearly the fraud "goes to the essence". But
the instant case, where the consummation would be perfectly legal and
harmless to the parties' health, presents a situation on which the authorities
are divided.8 Each view purports to be based on public policy: the one
favoring annulment focusses attention on the unenviable predicament of
the husband; 9 the other on that of the child, who is not only deprived of
his presumed legitimacy and his support, but even of a name. 10 Proponents
of the latter view also argue that such representation of paternity is
enough to put a reasonable man on inquiry." On closer analysis, how-
ever, this would be simply penalizing the man for the woman's fraud;'
2
moreover, the child, whatever the presumptions as to its legitimacy, has
been in fact proved illegitimate. It seems therefore that the cases granting
the annulment are more logical, although hard on the guiltless child. Some
states have remedied this dilemma by statute; ' but even in the absence of
a statute the instant decision appears to be proper, since the evidence of
fraud is of such considerable weight and since all the variable 14 equities
favor a decree.
5. Mayer v. Mayer, 207 Cal. 685, 279 P. 783 (1929) ; Johnson v. Johnson, ;,17 Ill.
App. 587 (931).
6. Aufort v. Aufort, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 310, 49 P. (2d) 62o (1935); Doe v. Doe,
6S Ati. 156 (Del. Super. 1933).
7. Wemple v. Wemple, 170 Minn. 305, 212 N. W. 8o8 (937).
8. Accord, Lyman v. Lyman, go Conn. 399, 97 At. 312 (1918) ; Shonfeld v. Shon-
feld, 26o N. Y. 477, 184 N. E. 6o (933) ; Barden v. Barden, 3 Dev. 548 (N. C. 1832) ;
Winner v. Winner, 171 Wis. 413, 177 N. W. 68o (1920) ; cf. Steele v. Steele, 96 Ky.
382, 29 S. W. 17 (i895). Contra: Arno v. Arno, 265 Mass. 282, 163 N. E. 861 (1929);
Fairchild v. Fairchild, 43 N. J. Eq. 473, II AUt. 426 (x887) ; Bryant v. Bryant, 171 N.
C. 746, 88 S. E. I47 (1916) ; cf. Todd v. Todd, 149 Pa. 6o 24 AUt. 128 (1896).
Note that there are decisions both ways in some jurisdictions.
9. The Michigan court in the leading case of Gard v. Gard, 2o4 Mich. 255, 267-8
(i918), speaking through Fellows, J., stated:
"It has been said that there are three parties to the contract of marriage, the two
contracting parties and the public. Can it be that a wise public policy requires in the
name of home the maintenance by the husband of an establishment presided over by
one who has deceived him as to the paternity of the little one who daily sits at his
board, who bears his name, who will in the absence of testamentary disposition inherit
his property, the offspring of another, a stranger to his blood? Most assuredly not."
io. Hardesty v. Mitchell, 302 Ill. 369, 134 N. E. 745 (1922) ; Murrell v. Industrial
Commission, 291 Ill. 334, 126 N. E. 189 (1920). This situation led to the statement
in Caruso v. Caruso, 104 N. J. Eq. 588, 146 At. 649 (1929) that the court, except for
gross fraud, should not annul a marriage and place on a child begotten before wedlock
the stigma of bastardy-but it neglected to state what constituted gross fraud.
ii. Said the court, in the leading case of Foss v. Foss, 94 Mass. 26, 29 (1866):
"He (the husband) took no steps to ascertain the truth of her statements concerning
the paternity of the child, but, relying solely on her assurances on that subject, he en-
tered into the contract of marriage. It seems to us that on these facts he was guilty
of a blind credulity, from the consequences of which the law will not relieve him. His
knowledge of the respondent's unchastity and her actual pregnancy was sufficient to
put a reasonable man on his inquiry."
12. In Lyman v. Lyman, go Conn. 399, 409, 97 At. 312, 315 (I918) the court
said: "We can conceive of few graver frauds than this, . .. and we can see no good
reason why . . . the one thus defrauded should be compelled to endure in silence the
situation which has thus been brought upon him, . . . and all by reason of his efforts
to play the manly part and repair his supposed wrong to the best of his ability. That
seems to us to be imposing a grievous punishment for a purely laudable action."
13. In Colorado, Kansas, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin
statutes save the child's legitimacy after annulment; in others, laws have been passed
making such fraudulent misrepresentations grounds for divorce. The N. J. DIvoRcE
Acr § 1 (6), 2 CoMP. ST. 2022 (i9io) ; IowA CoDa § 10476 (1931) are representative
of this.
14. The equity weighing in the child's favor is constant in all cases.
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Criminal Law-Single Agreement with Several Illegal Objects
Constitutes a Single Violation of Conspiracy Statute-Defendant was
convicted under Section 371 of the Criminal Code, upon several counts
of an indictment, each charging conspiracy to violate a different provision
of the Internal Revenue laws. The Circuit Court imposed a separate
sentence for each count. There was evidence of only a single agreement.
Held, judgment reversed. Evidence of a single agreement can sustain
conviction for only a single violation of the conspiracy statute. Braverman
v. United States, ii U. S. L. Week 4027 (U. S. i942).
At common law the gist of the crime of conspiracy was the agreement
by the conspirators to commit illegal acts.2 The crime was complete with
the agreement; that the contemplated acts were never committed was
immaterial, for on their commission the conspiracy was merged in the
primary offense.3  Under the federal conspiracy statute the lower courts
were divided on the interpretation of a conspiracy: one line of authority
holding that the conspiracy could be subdivided into as many offenses as it
had illegal objects; 4 the other, that the crime, regardless of its numerous
objects, was single.5 The court in the instant case adopted the latter
interpretation, asserting that the gist of the conspiracy was the agreement; 6
that a single agreement with diverse illegal objects was a single offense
under the statute. It distinguished two situations: where a single act is
amenable to punishment under two statutes; 7 and where each of a series
of acts in a single transaction is punishable under a statute." That the
same evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for one conspiracy is
necessary to conviction for another will preclude prosecution for the second
conspiracy, for such prosecution would fall within the constitutional pro-
hibition against double jeopardy.9 However, if more or different evidence
is required to sustain conviction for the second conspiracy, an acquittal
in a previous trial cannot be pleaded in defense to the second prosecution."
Thus, in the absence of a bill of exceptions bringing up the record of the
trial evidence, a multi-count indictment for several conspiracies under the
statute has been sustained.' In the instant case, as conceded by Govern-
ment counsel, there was evidence at the trial of but a single agreement,
1. 18 U. S. C. A. § 88 (Supp. 194o), "If two or more persons conspire whether
to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in
any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be fined not
more than $ioooo. or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
2. 2 BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) § 179; HARRISON, LAW OF ColsPm-
ACY (1924) 63.
3. HARRISON, LAW OF CONSPIRACY (1924) 73.
4. Montrose Lumber Co. v. U. S., 124 F. (2d) 573 (C. C. A. ioth, 194) ; cf. Olin-
stead v. U. S., ig F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) ; Beddow v. U. S., 70 F. (2d) 674
(C. C. A. 8th, 1934) ; Meyers v. U. S., 94 F. (2d) 433 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938).
5. U. S. v. Mazzochi, .5 F. (2d) 497 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; Powe v. U. S., ii F.
(2d) 598 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939); U. S. v. Anderson, ioi F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 7th,
1939).
6. Instant case at 4028.
7. Blockburger v. U. S., 284 U. S. 299 (C. C. A. 7th, i931).
8. Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U. S. 625 (1915). In this case the defendant had cut
open a number of mailbags while engaged in a single robbery. The statute under
which he was indicted, prohibited the cutting of any mailbag, making it a specific
offense for each mailbag cut, and the statute was so interpreted by the court. The
defendant was thus convicted separately for each mail bag he cut. Albrecht v. U. S.,
273 U. S. I (1938).
q. Short v. U. S., 91 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
io. Morey v. Commonwealth, 1o8 Mass. 433 (1871), is the basis of the law on this
point. The federal courts follow the rule laid down therein. Cf. Piquett v. U. S., 81
F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; Slade v. U. S., 85 F. (2d) 786 (C. C. A. ioth, 1936).
ii. Fleisher v. U. S., 91 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937).
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the objects of which were to violate several provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code; the court, properly held that this constituted only one
crime under the conspiracy statute. The punishment provided by the act
is for the conspiracy, not for the illegal objects it may have.12 To multiply
the crime by its number of illegal objects would be to increase the statutory
punishment without legislative authority.13
Labor Law-Prosecution for Disorderly Conduct of Picket in
a Secondary Boycott-Member of striking Newspaper Guild of New
York peacefully picketed I a bakery 2 which advertised in the newspaper
whose employees were on strike. The picket was convicted (one justice
dissenting) of disorderly conduct.3 People v. Fleishi an, 36 N. Y. S. (2d)
559 (Mun. Ct. 1940).
Originally the courts' major control of labor problems was by the
application of criminal laws,oa but the modem trend has been toward the
adjudication of rights in labor disputes in the civil courts.sb The majority
of the court approached the case as if it involved only the question of the
illegality of the secondary boycott 4 in which the defendant was engaged,
basing its decision upon precedent.5 The dissent advanced three distinct
views: that the case was controlled by a later New York decision; 6 that
peaceful picketing is protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom
12. Short v. U. S., 9i F. (2d) 614, 622 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
x3. Ibid.
I. The defendant carried a sign which read: "Unfair. This place advertises in the
'Day' which is on strike. Newspaper Guild, N. Y. CIO." The picketing was con-
ducted in a peaceful manner and free from actual disorder.
2. The bakery, outside of advertising regularly in the newspaper, had no connec-
tion with the "Day" or with the newspaper business.
3. PENAL LAW, § 722, subd. 2: "Any person who with intent to provoke a breach
of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the
following acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct:
. . .tActs in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offen-
sive to others." The defendant was convicted of an offense under this statute. It
might be noted that disorderly conduct was not a crime at common law and exists only
as a statutory offense, People v. Barbera, 127 Misc. 863, 214 N. Y. Supp. 778 (z926).
3a. Early strike cases were considered under the crime of criminal conspiracy.
Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Eccles, I Leach CL 273, i68 Eng. Rep. 24o, stated: ".
a combination not to work under certain prices is an indictable offense." TE.LER,
LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940), § 40: "It is in connection with
picketing that the sanction of breach of the peace or disorderly conduct has been most
generally applied."
3b. The famous case, In re Debs, I58 U. S. 564 (1894) recognized the weapon
of the injunction and in effect made criminal sanctions of secondary importance by
making courts of equity the arbiters of labor disputes.
4. The term "secondary boycott" as employed here refers to pressure put on third
parties to bring the adversary party to terms. Cf. TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COL-
LECrIvE BARGAINING (1940), § 122.
5. People v. Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. (2d) 238 (1939). In this case a
store was picketed because it had purchased a neon sign from a manufacturer with
whom the union was involved in a dispute. The opinion in the instant case, at 563,
stated: "As in the Bellows case . . . we conclude . . . that although the picketing
was done in a peaceful manner and free from actual disorder the act of picketing was
such that a breach of the peace might be occasioned. We cannot escape the conclusion
that the picketing in the instant case as in the Bellows case 'constituted a secondary
boycott and was illegal'."
6. People v. Muller, 283 N. Y. 28r, 36 N. E. (2d) 206, 136 A. L. R. 1456 (1941),
(941) COL. L. Rav. i444. Here defendants picketed a retail store which had in-
stalled a burglar alarm under a leasing and servicing agreement with the company
against which the pickets were striking. The court refused to hold the pickets guilty
of disorderly conduct and found the activity to be in a "labor dispute."
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of speech; 7 that a criminal court is not the proper tribunal for the adjudi-
cation of rights in a labor dispute." The New York anti-injunction statute 9
would have the effect of preventing the issuance of an injunction here to
prohibit the picketing because there was a "labor dispute" involved.10 But
the effect of the decision was to permit the complainant, the proprietor of
the newspaper," to do indirectly through the criminal courts that which
he could not do directly through the civil courts. Picketing was, by this
decision, as effectively halted as if an injunction had been issued; and the
complainant did not have to comply with any of the procedural require-
ments of the Anti-Injunction Act. 12  The trend in American decisions
and legislation has been toward a recognition of labor's right to pursue
legitimate labor practices,' 3 and the right to peaceful picketing has been
accorded the constitutional protection of free speech.14 The Thornhill and
Carlson cases involved the enforcement of penal statutes against picketing
in labor disputes, and while nowhere mentioned in either opinion, it might
be fairly inferred that the motivating force behind the decisions was a
desire to prevent the application of penal laws in determining rights in
labor disputes. The instant decision represents a repudiation of the prin-
7. Free speech is now the doctrinal protection of peaceful picketing. A dictum in
Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 3O U. S. 468 (1937) was the basis for this doctrine.
More recent decisions are American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321
(1941), ('941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 825; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940),
(1940) I BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 59; Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. io6 (194o). For a
criticism of the identification of the right to picket with freedom of speech, see TELLER,
LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (I940), § 136 and Supp. § 136; Teller,
Picketing and Free Speech (1942) 56 HARV. L. REV. i8o.
8. Dissent in instant case, p. 569: "In view of the present development of our
labor law, it is indeed strange that a court existing to administer the criminal law
should be called upon to decide the legality of peaceful picketing conducted by a labor
organization, when the right to obtain relief against such picketing in the civil courts
is in doubt. . . . If we should hold that peaceful picketing may constitute disorderly
conduct, a strange and illogical situation results. A magistrate, sitting in a criminal
court without a jury, could sentence the picket for peaceful picketing to imprisonment.
Yet, if the same picket were charged in the civil courts with contempt for peacefully
picketing in violation of an injunction previously granted, the picket would be entitled
to a trial by jury."
9. The New York anti-injunction statute is substantially similar to the Federal
statute, the Norris-La Guardia Act. In both a "labor dispute" is defined in the fol-
lowing terms: "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms
or conditions of employment or concerning the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment, or concerning employment relations, or any other controversy arising
out of the respective interests of employer and employee, regardless of whether or not
the disputants stand in the relation of employer and employee." 47 STAT. 73 (932),
29 U. S. C. A. § 113; CIVIL PRACTICE AcT § 876-a, subd. Ioc.
io. Davega City Radio, Inc. v. Randau, 166 Misc. 246, I N. Y. S. (2d) 514 (Sup.
Ct. 1937). Defendants picketed advertiser in newspaper whose employees were on
strike. It was held to be a "labor dispute" under N. Y. Civil Practice Act, and an in-
junction was denied. Alliance Auto Service, Inc. v. Cohen, 341 Pa. 283, i9 A. (2d)
152 (1941). But cf. B. Gertz, Inc. v. Randau, 162 Misc. 786, 205 N. Y. Supp. 871
(Sup. Ct. 1937) ; Mlle. Reif, Inc. v. Randau, 162 Misc. 247, I N. Y. S. (2d) 515 (Sup.
Ct. 1937). See Galenson and Spector, The New York Labor Injunction Statute and
the Courts (1942) 42 COL. L. REV. 51, 68-71.
ii. It should be noted that in all cases cited the complainant was the proprietor of
the picketed premises but in the instant case, the complaint was initiated by the
operator of the business on strike.
12. Both the New York and the Federal anti-injunction statutes provide substan-
tially similar procedural requirements preliminary to the granting of an injunction in
any labor dispute. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, § 876-a, subd. 9. In addition, certain findings
of fact must be made by the court before an injunction may be granted. Id. at subd. 1;
47 STAT. 71 (932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 107.
13. TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940), §§ 76 and 77.
14. See note 7 supra.
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ciple implicit in those cases. To subject to criminal prosecution a picketer
whose activity under the Anti-Injunction Act would not be enjoinable 11
vitiates the policy of that Act by leaving to the courts power effectually
to prevent labor agitation without the findings of fact prerequisite to the
issuance of an injunction.1
6
Labor Law-Effect of Certification by Labor Board of Bargain-
ing Agent on Existence of "Labor Dispute" under Anti-Injunction
Act-Petition for injunction by employer against picketing by defend-
ant union (CIO) where closed shop agreement had been executed between
employer and union (AFL) certified as collective bargaining agent for
company employees, after election conducted by State Labor Relations
Board. Lower court granted injunction pendente lite; reversed in Appel-
late Division on grounds of insufficient complaint.' Held, (three judges
dissenting) 2 reversed. "Labor dispute" within meaning of Anti-Injunction
Act was terminated by certification of bargaining agent by Labor Board;
trial court is not precluded by that statute from issuing injunction.
Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Shoe Salesmen's Union, 288 N. Y. 188, 42N. E. (2d) 48o (1942).
Generally, the existence of a contract between an employer and a
union representing its employees is insufficient ground, in the absence of
certain findings of fact required by Anti-Injunction Acts,8 for the issuance
of an injunction against picketing by another union; 4 that the employer
is an impartial bystander in a union jurisdictional dispute is immaterial.6
In these situations the courts have broadly defined the term "labor dis-
pute", thus narrowing their jurisdiction to grant injunctions against union
activity.6 But where a contract has been executed between the employer
15. See note 1o supra.
16. N. Y. Civm PRAcTICE AcT, § 876-a, subd. i.
1. 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 923 (Sup. Ct. 194o), rev'd, 262 App. Div. 769, 27 N. Y. S.
(2d) 883 (2d Dep't 194i).
2. Lehman, Ch. J, Desmond and Loughran, JJ.
3. N. Y. CivIL PAcncn AcT (Cahill, Supp. 1936) § 876-a. This is virtually iden-
tical in all respects with the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 STAT. 71
(1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § lO7; consequently, the federal decisions in note 4 supra are
in point.
4. Fur Workers Union Local No. 72 et al. v. Fur Workers Union no 21238 et al.,
105 F. (2d) i (C. A. D. C. I939), aff'd, 3o8 U. S. 522 (1939); Wilson & Co. v.
Birl et al., io5 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ; Donnelly Garment Co. v. Interna-
tional Ladies' Garment Workers Union, 99 F. (2d) 3o9 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) ; Blank-
enship v. Kurfman, 96 F. (2d) 450 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) ; Lund v. Woodenware Work-
ers Union, ig F. Supp. 607 (D. Minn. 1937) ; cf. Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259
N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932). Contra: Stalban v. Friedman, 171 Misc. Io6, II N.
Y. S. (2d) 343 (Sup. Ct. 1939), rev'd, 259 App. Div. 520, ig N. Y. S. (2d) 978 (ist
Dep't i94o).
5. Lauf et al. v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 3o3 U. S. 323 (1938). But cf. Union Premier
Food Stores v. Retail Food C. & M. Union, 98 F. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
6. Lauf et al. v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 (1938) ; New Negro Alliance
v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 (938) ; May's Furs & Ready to Wear, Inc.
v. Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. (2d) 279 (1940) ; Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y.
28, 11 N. E. (2d) 91o I937) ; cf. Exchange Bakery and Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin,
245 N. Y. 26o, 157 N. E. 130 (1927). But cf. Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N. Y. 390,
7 N. E. (2d) 674 (937).
By statute in Wisconsin the definition of "labor dispute" has been narrowed to
mean "any controversy between an employer and the majority of his employees in a
collective bargaining unit concerning the right or process or details of collecive bar-
gaining or the designation of representatives.' (Italics added.) 1939 Wis. LAws, c.
25; Wis. LAWs Aim. (Mason, z942) § 103.62 (3).
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and a certified bargaining agent, it may be protected by equity proceed-
ings. 7 The court in the instant case was faced with a delicate balance of
interests: on the one hand, the interest of the public, the employer and
the recognized union in stability of labor relations; s on the other, the
interest of labor in picketing as it has been identified with the constitu-
tional right of freedom of speech.9 Since the Labor Board had certified
one union as collective bargaining agent of the employees, the majority
reasoned that no labor dispute existed; 'o hence, the injunction did not
fall within the prohibition of the Civil Practice Act." But the dissenting
7. Oberman & Co. v. United Garment Workers of America, 21 F. Supp. 2o (W.
D. Mo. 1937) ; Euclid Candy Co. v. Summa, 174 Misc. ig, ig N. Y. S. (2d) 382 (Sup.
Ct. 1940), aff'd, 259 App. Div. io8r, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 614 (2d Dep't 1940) ; Stalban
v. Friedman, 171 Misc. io6, ii N. Y. S. (2d) 343 (Sup. Ct. 1939), rev'd, 259 App.
Div. 520, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 938 (Ist Dep't 1940) ; cf. Matter of Triboro Coach Corp.
v. State Labor Relations Board, 286 N. Y. 314, 36 N. E. (2d) 315 (941). But cf.
Fur Workers Union Local No. 72 et al. v. Fur Workers Union No. 21238 et al., io5
F. (2d) i (C. A. D. C. 1939), aff'd, 308 U. S. 522 (939).
It has been observed that the authority of the Oberman case was impaired by the
Lauf and New Negro Alliance cases, in which the Supreme Court imposed stringent
restrictions on the federal courts' jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes.
See Fur Workers case, supra at 13.
8. "Such a result is the only conclusion possible in consonance and harmony with
the public policy of the State as declared in the Labor Relations Act which was to
prevent or bring to an end strikes and other forms of industrial strife and unrest and
to encourage and effect industrial peace among employers and employees. . . . The
Legislature did not intend or propose that the procedure for that purpose should be
meaningless or that it might be flaunted and made meaningless by a group of employ-
ees who, themselves, had invoked the procedure to settle their dispute." Instant case,
at 197-8, 484.
Similarly, a majority of the court consisting of the same judges, over a dissent by
the dissenting judges in the instant case, set aside a Labor Board cease and desist or-
der against an employer's unfair labor practices where the employer, having contracted
with one union, refused to negotiate with a bargaining agent subsequently certified by
the Labor Board. It was asserted that stability of labor relations and the sanctity of
contracts properly arrived at impelled the protection of the existing contract. Matter
of Triboro Coach Corp. v. Labor Relations Board, 286 N. Y. 314, 36 N. E. (2d) 315
(1941).
9. Thornhill v. Alabama, 30 U. S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U. S.
io6 (194o); A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941), rehearing denied, 312 U. S.
715 (ig4i) ; see Senn v. Tilelayers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468, 478 (937). See
Teller, Picketing and Free Speech (i942) 56 HAtv. L. R-v. i8o; Note (194) go U.
OF PA. L. REy. 201.
io. The majority purported to find in the complaint allegations of intimidation
and false representations in connection with the picketing which in themselves would
have been sufficient ground for sustaining the complaint. Instant case, at 2O, 485;
Busch jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees Union, 281 N. Y. 15O, 22 N. E. (2d)
320 (1939). None of these allegations was noticed by the dissent; rather the union's
activities were characterized as "peaceful persuasion". Instant case, at 205, 487.
i. "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or con-
ditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment, or concerning employment relations, or any other controversy arising
out of the respective interests of employer and employee, regardless of whether or not
the disputants stand in the relation of employer and employee." N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE
AcT (Cahill, Supp. 1936) § 876-c.
On the language of the statute it is difficult to conclude but that a labor dispute
existed in the instant case; however, the majority decided in effect that the Board's
certification procedures constricted this definition. This conclusion was reached
despite the fact that the State Labor Relations Act specifically provides that "nothing
in this Act shall be construed to interfere with, impede or diminish in any way the
right of employees to strike or engage in other lawful, concerted activities." N. Y.
LABOR LAW (McKinney, 1940) § 713. Thus, it appears that the majority would have
been on somewhat surer ground had it rested its decision upon the allegations of un-
lawful activities which it purported to find in the complaint. See note io supra.
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opinion, following Stillwell Theatre Inc. v. Kaplan,12 asserted that the
unrecognized union's right-to picket peacefully is guaranteed by the Con-
stitution; 13 that this right could not be extinguished by the Board's cer-
tification of a bargaining agent.' 4 That picketing has been identified with
freedom of speech does not preclude its confinement within an "allowable
area of economic conflict;" 15 for freedom of speech cannot be enjoyed
completely uninhibited by legal restraints.' 6 But where by the terms of a
statute injunctive relief in the face of a labor dispute is expressly limited,
the court should be bound by those limitations. As pointed out in the
dissenting opinion, certification by the Board of a bargaining agent gives
no added sanctity to a contract between it and the employer; 17 the Board's
statutory authorization is restricted to the designation of the proper em-
ployees' representatives and the protection of the bargaining process.' 8
The existence of this administrative machinery permits no expansion of
the courts' equity jurisdiction in labor disputes, for the Anti-Injunction
Act and the Labor Relations Act were intended to be complementary,
neither encroaching on the other's operation.' 9 Further, the Supreme
Court has asserted that labor's right to express itself publicly by peaceful
picketing does not depend on the determination by a state court that a
labor dispute exists.2 0  Consequently, in the absence of a statute 21 removing
this situation from the prohibitive area of the Anti-Injunction Act, it would
seem that the court should withhold its injunctive powers.
22
12. 295 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (932). The court there asserted, "(To grant
the injunction) ...would thereby give to one labor union an advantage over another
prohibiting the use of peaceful and honest persuasion in matters of economic and social
rivalry. . . . It is not within the province of the courts to restrain conduct which is
within the allowable area of economic conflict." Id. at 412, 66.
13. See note 8 supra.
14. "Perhaps they (defendants) should have accepted in good faith the results of
the election ... but it is a right and not manners or sportsmanship that we are con-
cerned with." Instant case, at 205, 488.
i5. Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 412, 182 N. E. 63, 66 (x932);
Allen-Bradley Local No. iii v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S.
740 (I942) ; Carpenters and Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722
(1940).
I6. Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47 (I918) ; Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range
Co, 221 U. S. 418 (9I). See also Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940).
17. Instant case, at 204, 487.
I8. Cf. Virginian Railway v. Federation, 300 U. S. 515 (937) ; Lund v. Wooden-
ware Workers Union, ig F. Supp. 6oi (D. Minn. I937).
ig. Fur Workers Union Local No. 72 et al. v. Fur Workers Union No. 21238
et a., IO5 F. (2d) i (C. A. D. C. 1939), aF'd, 308 U. S. 502 (I939). But this case
expressly reserved decision on the effect of certification of a bargaining agent by the
NLRB. Id. at p. 12, n. 9. But cf. Oberman & Co. v. U. G. W. A., 21 F. Supp. 20
(W. D. Mo. 1937).
20. ". . . one need not be involved in a 'labor dispute' as defined by state law to
have a right under the 14th Amendment to express a grievance in a labor matter by
publication unattended by violence, coercion or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppres-
sive." Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 779 (1942).
21. Pennsylvania has passed such a statute, making anti-injunction provisions ex-
pressly inapplicable where there is a labor dispute "in disregard, breach or violation
of" a valid subsisting labor agreement arrived at between an employer and employees'
representatives designated in accordance with the Labor Relations Actes provisions.
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 194) tit 43, § 2o6-d (a). Pando v. Bartenders' Interna-
tional Alliance, Uniontown Local No. 78 et aL., 37 D. & C. 169 (940) ; cf. Tankin et
al. v. Hotel & Restaurant Workers Industrial Union, Local No. 356 et al., 36 D. & C.
537 (1939).
22. See Galenson and Spector, The New York Labor-Injunction Statute and the
Courts (1942) 42 COL. L. REv. 51; Jaffee, Inter-Union Disputes in Search of a Forum
(1940) 49 YALE L. J. 424.
RECENT CASES
Public Utilities-Carrier's Status Determined by the Nature of
its Services-A contract carrier, previously operating under contracts
with four department stores in Philadelphia was granted an amendment
to its permit by the Public Utility Commission allowing it to extend its
services to twenty-six retail specialty shops. Plaintiff, a common carrier,
protests the approval of the application, asserting that applicant had
assumed the status of a common carrier. Held, (one judge dissenting)
appeal dismissed. Carrier is a contract carrier. Merchants Parcel De-
livery Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 28 A. (2d) 340
(1942).
The test generally recognized is that a common carrier is obliged,
within the limits of its ability, to serve all the public who apply, while a
contract carrier is under no such obligation.1 Both the majority and dis-
sent, in the instant case, agree upon the basic concept that the nature of
the service offered 2 rather than the number of contracts held, is the
decisive criterion.8 The majority bases its decision upon the ground that
the services performed by the carrier are specialized services, offered to
a limited group, and concludes that because these services are so specialized
they are not public in nature. The dissenting opinion, however, asserts
that the scope of the carrier's business may assume such proportions that
it is actually serving the business of the general public.4 It is difficult to
draw precisely the line beyond which the scope of the business changes
the status of the carrier from contract to common.5 It is evident however,
that the decision in the instant case has extended this point farther than
ever before in Pennsylvania.6 In previous cases carriers operating under
i. A common carrier is defined as any person or corporation "holding out, offer-
ing or undertaking directly or indirectly, service for compensation to the public for
transportation of passengers or property. .. ."
A contract carrier is defined, in effect, as a carrier which does not hold itself out
to serve the public at large and which operates intra-state for compensation. PA. STAT.
ANx. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 66, § 1102.
2. "Again it is clearly not the manner in which the carrier is actually hauling
goods which determines his status, but the manner in which he offers to haul goods.
It seems clear that a carrier might well be willing to serve anyone, but if only one per-
son happens along to engage him and the carrier serves this one person under a con-
tract, can anyone say that the carrier is any less a common carrier because he hap-
pened to get only one customer." Canon, What Constitutes a Common Carrier? (1931)
15 MARQ. L. REv. 67, 68.
3. In the much cited case of Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266
U. S. 570 (1924), the Court stated: "Plaintiff is not a common carrier. . . . He
does not undertake to carry for the public and does not devote his property to any
public use. He has done nothing to give rise to a duty to carry for others. The pub-
lic is not depending on him for the use of his property for service, and has no right to
call on him for transportation."
4. Note (1942) 2o TFx, L. REv. 323.
5. Many decisions express the view that operation under several contracts does
not destroy the carrier's contract status.
Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U. S. 252 (1916) ; Film Transportation Co.
v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission, 17 F. (2d) 857 (E. D. Mich. 1927). In the
latter case the plaintiff was engaged in transporting picture films for 1so theatres un-
der special contracts. The court held it to be a contract carrier within the rule of the
Duke case, supra, even though it carried under so large a number of contracts. This
is an extreme case. Cf. Phillips v. Public Service Commission, 127 Pa. Super. 345,
I9i A. 641 (937).
6. As stated in the dissenting opinion: "It has been not only the practice and the
policy of this commission, but also of its predecessor, to hold that contract carriage
vanished when the number of contracts was increased through solicitation to the point
where the application 'contract carriage' became merely camouflage for common car-
riage. . . . I have been unable to discover one case before the appellate courts of
Pennsylvania where a carrier, engaged solely in the transportation business, serving a
class of shippers to the extent proposed to be served in this case, has not been held to
be a common carrier." Instant case, at 346.
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as few as eighteen,7 fifteen,8 eleven,9 seven,10 and five 11 contracts have
been held to be common carriers. Some states have used the number of
contracts obtained as a rule of thumb to determine the status of a common
carrier: 12 in Wisconsin three; in Texas, five. In the Pennsylvania cases
the implicit ground for the decisions has been the scope of the business of
the carrier as reflected by the number of contracts held. The majority in
the instant case gave little consideration to this significant factor. The
effect of this decision upon the regulation of carriers and stabilization of
the industry seems to be contrary to the general trend of the cases. It is
concededly futile to seek unity in this field by regulating a part of it, while
permitting the rest to operate uncontrolled.
3 The restrictions imposed
on the common carrier's activity places it at a serious disadvantage in the
competitive struggle with the contract carrier. 4
7. In Keystone Warehousing Co. v. Pub. Service Comm., 105 Pa. Super. 267, I6i
A. 89i (1932) the carrier solicited eighty various business houses in Philadelphia for
the business of transporting packages from their stores to customers in the City and
surrounding counties. It secured the business of eleven of them and entered into
written contracts which were practically uniform. The Court held this a common
carrier. This case is similar in almost all respects to the instant case.
8. In Bingaman v. Pub. Serv. Comm., io5 Pa. Super. 272, i6i A. 829 (932). A
carrier operating under eighteen private contracts was held a common carrier.
9. In Marshall v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 129 Pa. Super. 272, 275, 195 A. 475S 476
(937) the carrier operated under contracts with seven oil companies. The opinion
stated: "Although the intrastate transportation was confined to but three companies,
it extended to all points in the state, and to more than twenty towns and cities. The
large number of trucks and trailers inscribed with 'Transportation Petroleum Prod-
ucts', used extensively by appellant in interstate and intrastate transportation, indicates
quite clearly that the services offered by him were a general holding out of his willing-
ness to serve all who applied to the limit of his capacity." This reasoning could equally
well be applied to the operation of the "United Parcel Service of Penna., Inc."
io. In Gornish v. Pub. Util. Comm., i34 Pa. Super. 565, 572, 4 A. (2d) 569, 572
(938) the carrier held fifteen contracts. "By solicitation and by advertising the ex-
tent of their business was swelled. This was of itself an admission that they were
engaged in a public business and they were holding themselves out as ready to serve
the public generally."
ii. Spackman v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm., et al., i41 Pa. Super. 169 (1940).
12. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm. v. Krol, 245 Mich. 297, 222 N. W. 718 (1929);
Gornish v. Pub. Util. Comm., 134 Pa. Super. 565, 4 A. (2d) 569 (1938); Spackman
v. Pub. Util. Comm., 141 Pa. Super. i6i, i4 A. (2d) 839 (i94o). In Texas the Public
Utility Commission has followed a rule of thumb by which an operator is deemed a
common carrier if he has contracts with more than five different shippers. Note (z942)
TEX. L. REV. 325. The fact that a carrier operated under three contracts in the
Duke case has caused much confusion and has led some state commissions seemingly
to adopt an arbitrary rule and say that any carrier operating under three or less con-
tracts is a private carrier and therefore not subject to regulations and control by state
commissions. Cannon, op. cit. supra note 2.
13. See Note (938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 404, 413. "It is our belief that the
trend of future decisions will be gradually to include as common carriers moie,vo.the
so-called contract carriers. This will come about for the reason that regulatio' of
common carriers is stabilizing the industry, and lack of regulation of contract carI
is tearing down the industry. Therefore the public will itself demand more regulation
and the various regulatory bodies, will in keeping with this demand, attempt by regu-
lation to include more and more operators." Cannon, op. cit. supra note 2, at 75.
14. As noted in Note (1942) 2o TEx. L. REv. 343. "The recognized common car-
rier, observing the restriction imposed on his activity by law, is at a serious disad-
vantage in the competitive struggle with the contract carrier." This is developed by
simple arithmetic in the dissenting opinion of the instant case, at 348. It states in
effect that in r938 the applicant for a permit as contract carrier grossed $817,224.oo in
operations in four months. Under the law, as a contract carrier, it contributed nothing
toward paying Commission regulatory expenses. In the same year for the full year
the protestant grossed $r30,784.o. (Italics added.) On that sum it paid as a com-
mon carrier an assessment of $738.80. For the year 1939, the applicant did a gross
business of about $r,940,000.00 with the four department stores. It will pay no as-
sessment on that volume. For the same year, the protestant did a gross business of
$152,73i.oo. Although the assessment for i939 has not as yet been determined, protestant
will be required to pay further assessment for regulation of the motor vehicle industry
and applicant will pay nothing.
